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I. INTRODUCTION
Long before the framers of New Hampshire’s first constitution
admonished legislatures and magistrates to cherish education, the
provincial government had already established requirements for
providing public education; these requirements were related to the
size of a settlement.1
By 1708, the provincial government in New Hampshire had
established the first public school.2 Not surprisingly, the school was
in Portsmouth, which was, at the time,3 the seat of the provincial
government.4 On May 2, 1719, the province passed an act that
required communities of fifty families to employ a school teacher.5
Under the same act, a community that had one hundred families was
required to maintain a school.6 Thus, the province established the
duty to provide access to public education in New Hampshire and
mandated that the settlements implement it. Where a child lived was
the causal connection in the expansion of public education.
1. See, e.g., Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358. Part II, article 83
of the New Hampshire Constitution is the state’s educational article for the
encouragement of literature. It was the basis for the state’s school funding
litigation, commonly known as the Claremont decision. See Claremont Sch. Dist.
v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993). This clause was part of the
original constitution that was adopted in 1784. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83 annots.
While this article has been amended twice—once in 1877 to prohibit tax money
for the funding of schools of religious denominations and again in 1903 to permit
legislative regulation of monopolies and trusts—the original encouragement of
literature clause has remained unchanged for 245 years. Id. Provincial
requirements for public education were enacted on May 2, 1719. Act of May 2,
1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336.
2. Act of May 10, 1708, ch. 5, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 85.
3. Id.
4. RICHARD F. UPTON, REVOLUTIONARY NEW HAMPSHIRE 2 (Kennikat Press
1971) (1936).
5. Act of May 2, 1719, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws at 337.
6. Id.
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The purpose of this work is to ascertain whether, as a matter of
public policy, the location in which a student lives should continue
to determine which public school that student shall attend. The
article will first look at the development in, and some of the early
exceptions to, the residency requirement and how they have affected
education policy. Next, it will discuss the role that state and federal
statutes, court decisions, school funding litigation, technology, and
current national projects have in modifying a strict reliance on
residency as the primary factor that decides where students have
access to public education. Finally, it will analyze whether the
reliance on a residency-based public education system continues to
be justifiable.
While the focus of this article is on public education in New
Hampshire, the article also considers statutes and court decisions
from Florida and Colorado, as well as some federal statutes and
court decisions, in order to illustrate the general application of this
analysis to public education nationwide and to demonstrate that the
New Hampshire experience is not necessarily unique. There was no
particular rationale for the choice of states other than to offer a
limited, but geographically diverse, view as evidence of the parallel
between the state experience in New Hampshire and that in other
states, and of the experience at the national level.
A. The New Hampshire Experience
The demise of the residency requirement at the federal level
began in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In 1975, Congress
enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.7
This law created the impetus for school districts to place students
with a disability in public and private schools and programs outside
of their resident school district in order to comply with the law’s
requirement to provide every student with a disability with a free and
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.8
Although this act applied to a small subset of the public school
population, this was the first major departure from the residency7. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–
1482 (2006)).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(5).
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based education delivery model. This option for a small number of
children has fueled the demand for alternatives for all children.9
The U.S. Supreme Court followed in 1982 with a decision that
permitted children of illegal immigrants to attend public schools.10
In 1987, Congress enacted a law that permitted homeless children
and unaccompanied youth to attend school wherever they were,
regardless of residency.11 At the beginning of 2001, No Child Left
Behind became law and ushered in sanctions for low-performing
schools; sanctions that included parental choice of a public school
that was not in need of improvement and additional funding for
charter schools.12 The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the Ohio voucher program over a challenge based on the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.13
During this same time period, states were enacting laws, in
response to parental demands, to provide more public alternatives to
all students; unsuccessfully trying to implement voucher programs
or defend those already in existence against constitutional
challenges; and defending their methods of school funding from
constitutional challenges in both federal and state courts.14
While no single event would have had much effect on the
residency-based delivery system, in the aggregate, these events have
caused a schism in the current system. The question is: will the
recognition of this conflict—between the current legal requirement
9. Parents of children that are not identified with disabilities frequently call the
Department of Education looking for the same choices in education for their
children that children with disabilities have. In some cases, these parents have
attempted to use administrative due process hearings to obtain benefits similar to
those available to children identified with disabilities. E.g., In re Tamworth Sch.
Dist., Nos. 96-022 & 96-024 (N.H. Bd. of Educ. 1997), http://www.ed.state.nh.us/
education/laws/StateBoardDecisionsChronologically.htm.
10. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
11. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance (McKinney-Vento) Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-77, §§ 721–725, 101 Stat. 482, 525–28 (1987) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435).
12. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, sec. 101, §§1001–
1004, 115 Stat. 1425, 1439–44 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301–6304).
13. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla.
1996); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993).
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of residency for public school attendance and the commitment to
public school improvement by authorizing competitive, alternate
programs—provide the momentum for a wider discussion regarding
large-scale public school reform?
II. THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE FOR RESIDENCY
The general residency criterion for public school attendance in
New Hampshire currently states: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person shall attend school, or send a pupil to the
school, in any district of which the pupil is not a legal resident,
without the consent of the district or of the school board . . . .”15
This standard evolved from the provincial enactment that
required settlements to provide access to education when they
attained a particular number of households.16 The initial importance
of “residence” was that it triggered a community’s social
responsibility mandated by government.
In the beginning,
population was the driving force that determined when a community
was required to offer the rudiments of a public education: first by
employing a teacher when there were fifty households in a
settlement, and then by maintaining a school when the number of
households reached one hundred.17
Passed on December 23, 1842, chapter 73 of the New Hampshire
Revised Statutes represented the first codification of the residency
requirement as determinative of one’s access to public education.18
Its passage shifted the focus of residency from the trigger-point of a
community’s obligation to a criterion for access to the public school
system that was provided by every established community.19
Chapter 73, section 7 stated: “No person shall have a right to send to
or receive any benefit from any school in a district in which he is not
a resident, without the consent of such district.”20
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12(I) (2008 & Supp. 2009).
See Act of May 2, 1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336.
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 7 (1842).
See id.
Id.
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This statutory language memorialized the shift from the point
where the number of residents in a community activated a social
responsibility to the point where the social responsibility was now
limited to the number of residents in a community and others to
whom they chose to confer the benefit. This standard has continued,
largely unchanged, for over a century.21 Thus, residency has become
the primary criterion for accessing public education.
New
22
Hampshire is not unlike other states in this regard.
From provincial times until the commencement of New
Hampshire’s school financing litigation, the primary source of
funding for public education was local property taxes.23 Once a
community was large enough to be required to provide public
education, the government during the colonial period required the
community to fund it. When state law established residency as a
criterion for access to public education, its primacy was no longer
related to the size of the community. The concurrent fiscal
responsibility of each community to pay for public education, as
well as its social obligation to provide that education for its own
inhabitants, had been required since 1719.24 Resident-based public
education became a limiting factor on the social responsibility, as
well as on the fisc of a community, which required that communities
educate only those children within their boundaries and allowed
those communities to choose whether to offer the benefit to others
beyond their boundaries.
In addition to limiting the financial impact a community must
bear, residency had an additional value as a planning tool.
Community planners were able to collect data on population growth
and shifts, birth and death rates, available housing units, and
business and economic trends in order to forecast the increase or
decline in school populations. In this way, communities were able to
21. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (“[N]o
person shall attend a school . . . in any district of which the pupil is not a legal
resident . . . .”), with N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 7 (1842) (“No person shall have a
right to . . . receive any benefit from any school in a district in which he is not a
resident . . . .”).
22. See infra Parts III–IV.
23. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1379–80 (N.H. 1993).
24. See Act of May 2, 1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336.
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plan for: school building projects, which are expensive capital
investments and take a significant amount of time to complete; the
need for teachers and textbooks; and other elements necessary to the
public education delivery system.
With the benefits of the social and fiscal limitations along with
the ability to plan for the future, the residency requirement provided
an aspect of stability that is an essential virtue of public policy. In a
period of time when social mobility was relatively rare, this was a
rational public policy. In today’s world, where people move
frequently and regularly, it is appropriate to evaluate whether this
policy is still well suited to our educational goals. While there has
not yet been an organized challenge to the continued legitimacy of
residency as a primary determinant of access to public education,
other developments in public education may be eroding the value of
residency as the access point for public education. This erosion is,
perhaps, an unintended consequence of such developments, but it
should be considered as educators, state and local school boards of
education, legislators, and other leaders contemplate the future of
public education in a society that is far more mobile than were the
societies from the eighteenth century through the middle of the
twentieth century. This analysis will look at some of these
developments.
III. STATUTES, RULES, AND COURT DECISIONS: THE FACTORS THAT
UNDERMINE RESIDENCY
Almost two hundred years after the first school was founded in
Portsmouth and New Hampshire had required local government to
provide and pay for public education, the state legislature enacted a
statute that created a duty on parents requiring that they send their
children to school.25 Initially, children between the ages of eight and
fourteen residing in a school district were required to attend school
unless the local school board excused the attendance due to a
physical or mental condition or because the child attended a private
school that was approved by the local board.26 Today, the
25. Act of Feb. 17, 1903, ch. 13, 1903 N.H. Laws 13.
26. Id.
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distinction between the school district’s duty to provide public
education to its residents and a parent’s duty to compel attendance is
most evident by the fact that these two duties are set out in two
different chapters of Title XV, the education title, of the Revised
Statutes Annotated.27
In less than a decade after enacting the compulsory attendance
requirement, the New Hampshire legislature carved out the first
exception to this requirement.28 In 1911, the legislature permitted a
person having custody or control of a child to apply to the state
superintendent of public instruction whenever that person believed
that attending the district school was against the moral or physical
welfare of the child.29 Such an application required the state to
notify the local school board of the district where the child resided.30
After the notification, the superintendent was authorized to make
such orders as he judged were required by the circumstances,
including an order that the child attend school in another district.31
If ordered by the superintendent to attend school in another district,
the resident district was required by law to pay the child’s tuition to
the district where the child would now be going to school.32 Today,
New Hampshire law recognizes a number of exceptions to the
residency requirement, including the need to place a child with a
disability not only outside the district, but in a nonpublic school as
well.33 Most of these exceptions still require the resident district to
pay the cost of the education.34
This exception, which grants to the state the authority to
appropriate revenue from a local district, has its roots in the
provincial law that not only mandated that a local community hire a
27. The district’s duty to provide education to its resident students is found in
section 189:1-a of the New Hampshire Statutes, while the parents’ duty to compel
their children to attend the school to which they are assigned by the school district
is found at section 193:1(I). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 189:1-a, 193:1(I) (2008 &
Supp. 2009).
28. See Act of Apr. 13, 1911, ch. 139, 1911 N.H. Laws 157.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:10 (Supp. 2009).
34. See, e.g., id.
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teacher and maintain a school but also established a fine on the
selectmen in communities that failed to raise the necessary funds to
support a teacher or maintain a school when required to do so.35
This authority is the likely link that initially tied together liability for
the cost of public education and the residency requirement. It would
be nearly a century before that link would be broken by the decision
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 2002. In
Manchester School District v. Crisman, the First Circuit’s
interpretation of the New Hampshire statutes caused a local school
district to be liable for the education of a student, not because the
student and parents resided in the district, but because it was where
they were living when the child was placed in a home for children.36
It appears that the first chink in the armor of residency is linked
to the parental duty of compulsory attendance and the exceptions
that arose from it. This link may be the key to a fundamental
understanding of the sequence of public policy initiatives that
occurred during the twentieth century and into the current century
concerning parental choice options. Over the last thirty years, New
Hampshire has been engaged in these public policy discussions as
part of a national dialogue about public education.37 The legislature
has enacted various initiatives to provide some measure of parental
choice in public education.38 These efforts have been largely
unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, including the fact that any cost
associated with these initiatives continued to be the responsibility of
the resident school district.39 It was not until 2003, when the
35. Act of Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358.
36. 306 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2002).
37. Beginning in 1975 and continuing through 2007 the indices of the House and
Senate Journals for the New Hampshire General Court regularly contain entries for
the introduction of bills for charter schools and voucher programs that would
permit parents to choose an alternative to public educations. Committee records
and research, in addition to the author’s personal observation, indicate a number of
other states had enacted or were considering similar initiatives within the same
time period. See, e.g., Sara Vitaska, School Choice, 14 LEGISBRIEF 9 (2006)
(providing a selected review of the history of public school choice).
38. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193:3, 194-A (2006).
39. Section 194-B:11(I) of the New Hampshire Statutes requires resident school
districts to pay to a charter school not less than 80 percent of that district’s average
per-pupil cost when a pupil attended a charter school outside the resident district.
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legislature authorized a ten-year pilot project that permitted the State
Board of Education to directly authorize charter school applications
without any approval at the local level, that New Hampshire finally
had at least one popular public choice option to compete with the
resident district public school.40 But the success of this option was
due, in large measure, to the fact that the state, and not the resident
school district, paid the cost for students that attended these charter
schools.41 The state legislature suspended this program in 2007.42 A
more detailed discussion of public choice options and their history
appears later in this article.43
A. Extended Learning Opportunities (ELO)
Although New Hampshire’s experience with legislativelyapproved options to public education may not be as robust as those
in other states, one should not conclude that the state lags behind in
preparing for public education that will meet the needs of students in
the twenty-first century. In 1919, the legislature created the State
Board of Education and invested the board with extraordinary
authority that has not been amended in ninety years.44 The grant of
authority reads, in relevant part: “The state board shall have the same
powers of management, supervision, and direction over all public
schools in this state as the directors of a business corporation have
over its business, except as otherwise limited by law.”45
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I). Records at the New Hampshire Department
of Education indicate that no district successfully adopted such a provision when it
was placed on the school district warrant. See SARAH BROWNING, N.H. DEP’T OF
EDUC., CHARTERS GRANTED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION PURSUANT TO
RSA 194-B:3 1997–2000 (2010) (on file with author) (compiling information from
charter school applications that came before the State Board of Education).
40. Act of July 18, 2003, ch.273, 2003 N.H. Laws 522 (codified as amended at
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3-a).
41. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I)(b).
42. Act of June 29, 2007, ch. 263, § 93, 2007 N.H. Laws 301, 331. In 2009, the
state legislature renewed the moratorium. Act of June 30, 2009, ch. 144, § 153,
2009 N.H. Laws 146, 184.
43. See infra Part III.D.
44. Compare Act of Mar. 28, 1919, ch. 106, § 5, 1919 N.H. Laws 155, 157–58,
with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5 (2008).
45. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5.
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At the same time, the board was also permitted to set the
minimum curriculum and education standards for all grades of the
public school.46 Today, those standards are one part of the code of
administrative rules for education.47 By statute, these rules have the
force and effect of law.48 Since the legislature created the State
Board of Education, they have shared, to some degree, the public
policy role for public education.49 With some exceptions, it seems
that the legislature and the state board have each exercised their
authority in the public policy realm without great acrimony.50 In its
most recent adoption of rules for setting the minimum standards for
public school approval, the board permitted local school districts to
award credit to students for what they defined as ELO.51 These
opportunities are defined as “the primary acquisition of knowledge
and skills through instruction or study outside of the traditional
classroom methodology” and include such options as independent
study, private instruction, performing groups, internships,
community service, apprenticeships, and online courses.52
It is accurate to state that ELOs are, at least at the moment, an
option in high school and, in some cases, middle school.53 However,
gains in the status of ELOs among school districts within the state
can be considered another development that reduces the importance
46. Act of Mar. 28, 1919 § 5; cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:8(I).
47. N.H. CODE R. ED. 306 (Weil 2009) (describing minimum standards for
public school approval).
48. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:22(II) (2007).
49. The New Hampshire Constitution, Part II, Article 5 grants full power and
authority to the General Court to make laws, while in section 186:5 the general
court grants a broad delegation of this duty for public education to the State Board
of Education. Compare N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5, with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
186:5.
50. Since section 186:5 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1919, it is
reasonable to conclude that the power-sharing arrangement between the legislature
and the State Board of Education has been, for the most part, amicable. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5; Act of Mar. 28, 1919 § 5. Were this not the case, the
legislature could have amended the statute.
51. N.H. CODE R. ED. 306.04(a)(13) (requiring school districts to adopt and
implement a written policy if they choose to offer ELOs).
52. Id. at 306.02(c) (providing the definition for ELOs).
53. Id. at 306.26(f) (middle school); id. at 306.27(b)(4) (high school). However,
there are no provisions for ELOs in elementary grades prior to middle school.
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of residency. Any of the ELO options can occur in places outside
the resident school district, and while a school still remains an
anchor for the awarding of credit for ELO activity, there is nothing,
beyond the current residency statute, that ties a student to a school in
the district where he resides.54 It is not unreasonable to hypothesize
that a student in the future might be able to seek a school in a
community where his internship, community service, or
apprenticeship was located and then develop a plan for an
independent study coupled with some regular classes at an approved
high school or adult high school in that community in order to earn a
school year’s worth of credit or more.
Such options also
contemplate the acquisition of knowledge and skills from foreign
travel. This again demonstrates the inconsequentiality of a residency
requirement in order to access public education.
Currently, every ELO must be approved by the school in which
the student resides and be based on a standard adopted by the local
school district, if that district chooses to permit students to earn
credits using the ELO option.55 That is not to say that a local
approval process must or will always continue to be the only method
for accessing this option. Only a lack of capacity at the state level
prevents the legislature and the state board from considering a public
policy that would allow a student to apply to the Department of
Education for approval of an ELO option. While this is not currently
contemplated, the theory is not an unimaginable progression from
where we are today.
B. Manchester School District v. Crisman
State law requires the State Board of Education to provide an
appeal and issue a decision to any individual that disputes a decision
of a local school system or the Department of Education.56 Over the
years, the board has heard a number of appeals dealing with the
residency issue. A change in the law in 2003 shifted these
responsibilities to the Commissioner of Education and removed the

54. See id. at 306.26(f), 306.27(b)(4).
55. Id. at 306.04(a)(13).
56. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-N:11(III) (2000).
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board from hearing the appeal of that decision.57 While the
commissioner’s decisions are not currently published, the prior state
board decisions are available on the department website.58 The only
current residency case that has found its way into the judicial system
is Manchester School District v. Crisman.59 This case has a
procedural history that spans a decade, beginning with an
administrative decision in 1992.60 The case involved a child who
was born in Colorado in September of 1988 and who traveled with
her parents to Manchester, New Hampshire in January of 1989.61
While in Manchester, the child was involved in a serious accident
and sustained permanent injuries.62 The Division of Children and
Youth Services helped the parents place the child in a group home in
Pittsfield, New Hampshire.63 The application for placement listed an
address in Manchester for the parents.64
The decision articulated the basic difference between the
residency requirement in section 193:12(I) of the New Hampshire
Statutes and a determination of which school district was liable for
the cost of a public education, and expressed great concern regarding
the wisdom of relying on traditional definitions of residency to
determine school district liability, at least for the education of
students with disabilities.65 Based on the Crisman opinion, the
district where the student resides may not always be the district
liable for the cost of a student’s elementary or secondary
57. Act of Aug. 20, 2003, ch. 222, § 2, 2003 N.H. Laws 339, 339–40 (codified as
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12(VI) (Supp. 2009)).
The
Commissioner’s decision is appealable to a court of competent jurisdiction. Id.
The court of competent jurisdiction is the New Hampshire Supreme Court. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 541:6 (2007).
58. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., State Board Decision by Subject, http://www.ed.state.
nh.us/education/laws/StateBoardDecisionbySubject.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
59. 306 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
60. Id. at 5. A redacted version of the administrative decision is available at the
New Hampshire Department of Education, Office of Legislation and Hearings.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cf. Crisman, 306 F.3d at 11 (“The definition of legal resident contained in
section 193:12 does not affect the particular statutory provisions on which
[Manchester School District’s] liability to [the child] turns.”).
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education.66 The court in Crisman held that the Manchester school
district was liable for the educational costs of a student with a
disability who had never established residency in Manchester and
who, by the time she was old enough to attend school, was living
and going to school in another New Hampshire school district.67
The court advanced the premise that the residency requirements in
the state’s statutes simply limit where a child may go to school; they
do not address the issue of who is responsible to pay for the
student’s education.68
The First Circuit relied on several sections of section 193:12, the
state’s residency law, and on the provisions of chapter 186-C, the
state’s special education law, to affirm the district court’s decision.
The district court’s decision upheld the hearing officer’s
determination that, despite all of the legal theories advanced by the
school district, Manchester was the school district responsible to pay
for the education of the child because the child and her parents were
living in Manchester at the time that the child was placed in a home
for children in Pittsfield.69
In its decision, the court stated that section 193:12, the current
residency statute, only sets forth where a child may go to school,
unless the child meets the requirements of one of the exceptions; and
section 193:12(V) is an exception that requires the determination of
liability to be made in accordance with section 193:29.70 The court
also reviewed the language of section 193:27, which states, in
relevant part that a sending district is “the school district in which
the child most recently resided other than in a home for children.”71
The court next relied on a recent New Hampshire Supreme Court
decision, which held that “most recently resided” meant the place
where one lived prior to placement in a home for children, regardless
of residency.72
66. See id. at 11–13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 11–13.
70. Id. at 12.
71. Crisman, 306 F.3d at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
193:27(IV) (1999)).
72. Id. at 12 (citing In re Gary B., 466 A.2d 929, 932 (N.H. 1983)).
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Without challenging the merits of the decision by either the First
Circuit or the New Hampshire Supreme Court, it is still possible to
observe that the Crisman decision breaks the link between residency
and liability. If a liability determination may obligate a school
district for the expenses of educating a child that is an inhabitant, but
not a resident, of the district, then the premise of residency as a limit
on fiscal obligation is severely compromised. Furthermore, with this
link between residency and financial liability now broken, this
decision arguably strengthens the position of the plaintiffs in the
school funding litigation cases. If there is no correlation between
where a student lives and which community pays for a student’s
education, the notion that it is the state’s responsibility to provide the
access for all its resident students to get a public education becomes
more viable. So, even a correct decision concerning liability may
have unintended consequences that have the power to undermine the
stability of an unrelated and long-standing public policy that set out
residency as the principal factor in determining access to public
education.
C. Plyler v. Doe
On the national level, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
residency in a decision that held a 1975 Texas law unconstitutional
because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by treating children of illegal immigrants differently
than other children within Texas’s borders.73
The case of Plyler v. Doe reached the Court by way of two cases
that challenged the constitutionality of a Texas law involving
residency: (1) a class action suit from the Eastern District of Texas;
and, (2) a number of challenges in the Southern District of Texas,
originating in various parts of the state, that were consolidated
below.74 On appeal from the decisions of the Fifth Circuit, the U.S.
Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.75 At issue was a state
statute that withheld state funds from school districts for the
education of children that were not legally admitted to the country
73. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
74. Id. at 206, 209.
75. Id. at 210.
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and therefore not residents of Texas.76 It also authorized school
districts to refuse to enroll these children as students in the public
school system.77 In the class action, the certified class was a group
of undocumented children of elementary or secondary school age.78
Texas argued that since they entered Texas illegally, these
children were not residents of Texas and were not properly within
the jurisdiction of the state; therefore, they were not entitled to
access public education and were not entitled to protection under the
U.S. Constitution.79 Texas also maintained that the statute was a
financial measure to prevent a drain on the State’s treasury.80 The
district court held that the state statute was an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.81 Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld
the district court’s opinion.82
Again, what makes this opinion interesting to the analysis
concerning the relevancy of residency is not the holding or the
reasoning employed by the various courts to strike down the state
statute. What is notable are two of the district court’s findings: (1) in
the class action case, the court found that the number of illegal
immigrants seeking to enroll in public schools in Texas was small
and that the increase in enrollment was attributable, for the most
part, to children who were legal residents;83 and (2) in the
consolidated cases, the court found that the state’s concern for fiscal
integrity was not a compelling state interest.84 It is also interesting
to note that part of the Supreme Court’s holding extended equal
protection to the student class on the theory that minors are not held
responsible for the illegal actions of their parents.85 The Court
reasoned that it would be fundamentally unfair to disable a child by
withholding the benefits of public education where the child was
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 208–09, 230.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 209.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219–20.
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brought to this country by his parents and had no opportunity to cure
his disability, because as a minor child he could not control the
actions of his adult parents.86 Again, without debating the validity of
the Plyler decision, it is apparent that the value of residency as a
limit on financial responsibility and social obligation are further
eroded by this decision. If fiscal integrity is not a compelling state
interest and students whose parents cannot meet the residency
requirements of a state law may still access the public education
system, the rhetorical question must be: what is the value of a
residency requirement?
D. Options to Resident District Public School Attendance
New Hampshire’s experience with school choice options has
been limited and not entirely successful from the view of those who
support choice. With the enactment of the statute that created
compulsory attendance as a parental duty, the initial choice was for
the parent to have a child excused from attendance by the local
district or appeal to the state for a change in school assignment.87
As of this writing, section 193:3 provides two options for a
change in school assignment, one based on manifest educational
hardship, and the other based on best interests of the child.88 It
should be noted that neither of these options is clearly defined, and
both require approval by the resident school district and the payment
of tuition by that district to the district to which the student is reassigned.89 This option is infrequently approved, onerous for
parents, and designed to maintain the status quo of the union of
residency with liability.90 Although this is not necessarily a
86. Id.
87. Act of Apr. 13, 1911, ch. 139, 1911 N.H. Laws 157.
88. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:3 (Supp. 2009).
89. Id. § 193:3(I), (III).
90. A survey of the recent state board administrative hearings indicates that
manifest educational hardship is often the basis for appeal of a local school board
decision.
See N.H. Dep’t of Educ., Laws & Hearing / Mediation,
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/laws/StateBoardDecisionbySubject.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2010) (demonstrating that approximately twenty of the eighty-eight
cases contain “manifest educational hardship” or “hardship” in the description of
the case). Since “best interest of the child” decisions cannot be appealed to the
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satisfactory option for parents, it is still evidence of a public policy
that is willing to carve out niches in the residency criterion. In
addition to this statutory provision, parents willing to pay tuition to
another public school district have successfully enrolled their
children in other districts when district policies have permitted
accepting tuition students.91 In addition, there are some collective
bargaining agreements with teachers where the employing district
permits those employees who live outside the district in which they
teach to enroll their children in the employing district, sometimes at
a significantly reduced tuition.92 Under current law, a child may be
excused from attending a public school within the resident school
district if the child is attending a charter or nonpublic school or is
enrolled in a home education program.93
1. Vouchers and Section 194-A
The concept of voucher programs is another attack on the
viability of the residency requirement. State legislation permits
school districts to issue vouchers for a specified amount to pay for a
student’s education in a private school, anywhere in the state, that is
authorized and willing accept the vouchers.94 While the concept
undermines local public education, the programs have not had much
of an effect because they are generally challenged on constitutional
grounds and because the challenges, to date, have been very
successful.95 The early voucher legislation provided for the state to
pay the vouchers directly to the schools.96 Since most of the private
state board, pursuant to section 193:3(III)(h), there is no method, short of
surveying every school district, to know how often these requests are approved,
but it is unlikely that the approvals would be more frequent than those for manifest
educational hardship. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:3(III)(h).
91. Statistics are available from the New Hampshire Department of Education,
Office of Information Services upon request.
92. See Judgment of July 20, 2006, No. 06-05-065 (N.H. Dep’t of Educ. July 20,
2006), http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/laws/0605065.htm.
93. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1(I) (2006).
94. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, repealed by Act of May
1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65.
95. See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d
933, 944 (Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412–13 (Fla. 2006).
96. See Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 397.
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schools that were willing to accept these vouchers were parochial
schools operated by the Roman Catholic Church, the early
challenges were based on religious clauses in state constitutions or
the Establishment Clause of U.S. Constitution.97 Supporters of the
voucher programs conceived a strategy to get around this
impediment by having the school district pay the voucher to the
parent of the student. The opponents met this challenge by resorting
to various educational clauses in a state’s constitution.98
New Hampshire was willing to consider providing vouchers even
before it statutorily permitted home-schooling and charter schools.
The impetus for this legislation was a grant from the federal
government to the New Hampshire Department of Education.99
The New Hampshire Department of Education received the
federal grant in the spring of 1973 to develop a model to test an
unrestricted voucher program.100 The department agreed, on advice
of counsel, to eliminate sectarian schools from participation due to
recent Supreme Court rulings.101 In December of 1973, the Attorney
General’s office encouraged the Department to seek legislation to
resolve issues that required legislative authority to implement the
program.102
In the 1975 legislative session, two voucher bills were filed.103
The bill requested by the Department was sponsored by a bipartisan
group of legislators led by the former chairman of the House
Education Committee and, at the time, the House Majority Leader.104
97. Martin R. West, School Choice Litigation After Zelman, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 167, 177–78 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
98. See, e.g., Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 935; Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 397–
98.
99. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, sec.1, § 1, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, 152–53,
repealed by Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65; ROBERT L.
BRUNELLE, OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, N.H. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NEW
HAMPSHIRE VOUCHER EXPERIMENT 6 (1976).
100. BRUNELLE, supra note 99, at 1.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id.
103. See N.H. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 1137 (1975) (listing H.B. 374 and H.B.
867).
104. Id. at 428; THE BROWN BOOK OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE LEGISLATURE 45–46
(1975). Additionally, the author was employed by the Office of the Speaker of the
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H.B. 867, an act providing for the test of education voucher
programs, became Chapter 182 of the Laws of 1975.105 The other
bill, H.B. 970—an act providing for partial tuition payments for
parents of children attending private elementary schools if approved
by local referendum—was killed by the House.106 The House
Education Committee report on H.B. 970, which recommended the
bill as inexpedient to legislate, offered the following: “There is an
on-going test of the voucher plan in New Hampshire. The Education
Committee feels that HB 867 should be supported now and that this
bill, which would be unconstitutional as written, should not be
passed.”107
Chapter 182 was intended to permit a voucher pilot project when
federal money was available.108 It authorized the Board of
Education to operate the program and required voter approval by a
local school district meeting in order to participate in the program.109
It also contained a section that terminated the authority granted to
conduct the test as of June 30, 1983.110 It would not take that long
for the program to fail. At school district meetings held in March of
1976, there were six school districts that had articles on their
warrants to permit them to participate in the voucher program.111
Not one of them passed.112 The program ended on May 31, 1976.113
The statute, section 194-A, was repealed in 1986 as part of a bill to
reauthorize and reorganize the Department of Education, under the
then-existing sunset provisions of state law.114 The primary
House from 1975–79 and ultimately assigned as research assistant to the House
Majority Leader and is familiar with the legislative activities during this time
period.
105. N.H. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, supra note 103, at 1274.
106. Id. at 618.
107. Id.
108. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, sec. 1, § 1, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, 152–53,
repealed by Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65.
109. Id. § 2–3.
110. Id. § 6.
111. WILLIAM H. MILNE, N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT: NEW HAMPSHIRE
EDUCATION VOUCHER PROJECT 15 (1976) (on file with author).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 18.
114. Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65.
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opponent of the test project was the New Hampshire chapter of the
National Education Association (NH-NEA).115
Despite the Department’s initial intention to exclude sectarian
schools, legislation was designed to be an unrestricted voucher
program, and it contained language that stated that the pilot project
was not intended to aid any particular school or type of school, but
was intended to aid students.116 This appears to be an attempt to
satisfy the three-prong Lemon test of (1) offering a general welfare
benefit to an individual rather than advancing or inhibiting a
particular religion; (2) serving a legitimate secular purpose; and (3)
having no excessive entanglements between church and state—a test
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court four years earlier.117 Since no
school district elected to participate in the voucher program, it was
never challenged in court as offensive to either the state constitution
or the Federal Constitution on any grounds, including violation of
the Lemon test.
More recent efforts have not been any more successful. In 2004,
the legislature considered two bills related to vouchers. H.B. 727
created a committee to study the issue of school choice in New
Hampshire.118 The study did not result in any changes in choice
options for parents beyond what already existed.119 The House
Education Committee referred H.B. 754, which established an
educational certificate program to allow parental choice in the
selection of schools for children, to interim study where it died at the
end of the session.120 There were many opponents to vouchers this

115. BRUNELLE, supra note 99, at 4.
116. Act of May 27, 1975 sec. 1, § 1.
117. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
118. Act of June 11, 2004, ch. 204, 2004 N.H. Laws 375.
119. Section 5 required: “The committee shall report its findings and any
recommendations for proposed legislation to the senate president, the speaker of
the house of representatives, the senate clerk, the house clerk, the governor, and
the state library on or before November 30, 2004.” Id. No additional parental
choice options have been enacted since 2004.
120. N.H. General Court Bill Status System, Docket of HB 754, http://www.
gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/bill_docket.aspx?lsr=218&sy=2004&sortoption=&
txtbillnumber=HB754 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Bill Status].
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time, including the State and the Department of Education.121 One
reason for opposition that had not been a factor in 1975 was the
Claremont school-funding litigation.122 With the New Hampshire
Supreme Court monitoring the legislative efforts to define and fund
an adequate education, this was probably not the ideal time to siphon
off limited state resources to fund any private alternative to public
education.123
Both Florida and Colorado have had their voucher programs
declared unconstitutional by the supreme courts in those states.124
This may be the one area where state courts are willing to maintain
the status quo and limit the options for residency-based education.
Yet this may be due more to the fact that these programs generally
provide public money to private schools in addition to, or as an
alternative to, public schools, rather than due to an aversion to
choice in public education. It is also interesting to note that the
voucher statutes in these two states were not struck down based on a
state constitutional provision requiring the separation between
church and state.125 This will become evident in the sections dealing
specifically with the Colorado and Florida educational development.
However, due to the myriad educational choices already available in
both states, the Florida and Colorado state court decisions
invalidating voucher programs have not reinforced residency as a

121. As special assistant to the commissioner and an advisor to the State Board of
Education, the author has primary responsibility for the legislative agenda of the
Department of Education and was an active participant in the legislative process of
the 2004 legislative session.
122. See Bill Status, supra note 120.
123. The school funding litigation that began as Claremont School District and its
progeny have kept the New Hampshire Supreme Court involved in the
legislature’s efforts to define, determine the cost of, fund, and assess the
provisions of an adequate education for more than a decade. See, e.g., 635 A.2d
1375 (N.H. 1993).
124. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 944
(Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412–13 (Fla. 2006).
125. See Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 943–44 (finding instead that the
statute violated the state’s constitutional mandate to empower democratically
representative school boards, not parents directly, to control public education);
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 412 (finding instead that the statute violated the state’s
constitutional mandate to provide adequate public education).
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principle for accessing public education.126 In contrast, the U.S.
Supreme Court, within the same time period, upheld a voucher
program that had been enacted by the Ohio legislature.127 This
decision, because of its narrow scope of review, also had no
discernable effect on residency-based education.
2. The Option to Home School
The next successful choice option enacted in New Hampshire
was the statute that permitted parents to withdraw their children from
public school for the purpose of educating them at home.128 Unlike
the change of school assignment option, the home schooling option
did not require approval of the local district, although initially a
school district could challenge a parent’s decision to home school a
child.129 Home schooling also did not involve an appropriation of
any state or local tax money. This legislation was not enacted until
1990. The legislative purpose stated:
The general court recognizes, in the enactment of RSA 193A as inserted by section 3 of this act, that it is the primary
right and obligation of a parent to choose the appropriate
educational alternative for a child under his care and
supervision, as provided by law. One such alternative allows
a parent to elect to educate a child at home as an alternative
to attendance at a public or private school, in accordance
with RSA 193-A. The general court further recognizes that
home education is more individualized than instruction
normally provided in the classroom setting.130

126. See infra Parts IV–V for explicit detail of the choices available to parents
that do not choose to enroll their children in the public schools in both Florida and
Colorado.
127. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:1–10 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
129. Act of Apr. 28, 1990, ch. 279, sec. 3, § 7, 1990 N.H. Laws 547, 550 (codified
as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:7 (2008)) (describing the process by
which a school district may challenge a parent’s decision to home school).
130. Id. at sec. 2.
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There must be a participating agent responsible for overseeing
every home school program.131 The law permits the resident
superintendent, a non-public school principal, or the Commissioner
of Education to act as participating agents.132 The Department of
Education encourages parents to elect the resident superintendent as
the participating agent in order to foster communication at the local
level. This communication can be important if home-schooled
students wish to participate in co-curricular courses or activities at
the local elementary or secondary school, which they are permitted
to do by law.133 It also makes the transition of returning to public
school easier if the parents choose to terminate the home school
program or the program is terminated by order of a hearing officer,
when the child’s annual evaluations for two consecutive years are
unsatisfactory.134 This policy supports the norm of residency-based
education, while the choice itself invalidates the value of the norm.
The ability of a parent to educate a child at home is not only a
challenge to the residency requirement, but also an assault against
the entire system of universal public education. This is not a
criticism of the home-education model. It is simply to state the
fundamental difference between teaching a child one-on-one as
opposed to in a classroom with twenty or more peers. It is a basic
withdrawal from and a repudiation of that state of society created by
constitutions for the protection of a form of governance that
guarantees the continued existence of a free society.135 While the
home school population may reduce the financial impact on the
system, it is one factor that undermines the ability of a district to
plan for its needs. Alone, home education is not a significant factor,
but it is part of the story.

131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:4(II).
132. Id.
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1-c.
134. See id. § 193-A:6(III) (setting forth a one-year probationary period following
the first unsatisfactory annual evaluation and revocation, subject to due
procedures, following the second unsatisfactory annual evaluation).
135. Cf. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 3 (“When men enter into a state of society, they
surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the
protection of others . . . .”).
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3. The Charter School Option
The last New Hampshire alternative came during the 1995
legislative session when the charter school law was enacted.136 It
was a complicated law that required two votes at the local level and
an approval by the State Board of Education in between.137
Although the board issued a number of charter certificates, no
charter schools have opened under this provision.138 It was not until
the 2003 legislative session that a pilot program was established that
permitted charter groups to bypass the first local vote and go directly
to the Board for authorization.139 The pilot program also eliminated
the greatest obstacle for charter schools, which was the second local
vote.140 It was this vote that required the local districts to
appropriate 80 percent of the per-pupil cost to the charter school.141
No district was ever willing to tax itself to support a charter
school.142 The pilot program was able to surmount this obstacle
because the state’s funding mechanism at the time used a formula
that yielded a statewide per-pupil cost for an adequate education.143
The legislature simply directed the school districts to pay to the
charter schools the per-pupil amount for any student who resided in
136. See Act of June 19, 1995, ch. 260, § 6, 1995 N.H. Laws 409, 410–23
(codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-B:1–22 (2008 & Supp.
2009)).
137. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-B:3(III).
138. Records at the New Hampshire Department of Education indicate that
between 1996 and April of 2000, ten communities had adopted the provisions of
section 194-B:4. No charter schools have ever opened in any of these school
districts. See BROWNING, supra note 39.
139. See Act of July 18, 2003, ch. 273, § 1, 2003 N.H. Laws 522, 522 (codified as
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3-a).
140. Id.
141. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I).
142. Although the state board approved charters under the local option provided
in section 194-B of the New Hampshire Statutes, no charter schools have yet
opened under this provision and all currently existing charter schools have opened
under the pilot program under section 194-B:3-a and are funded by the state
pursuant to section 194-B:11. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B; BROWNING,
supra note 39.
143. See Act of July 18, 2003 § 2 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 194-B:11(I)).
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its district but elected to go to a charter school.144 Ultimately, the
school funding law was amended and the new formula ceased to
produce a statewide per-pupil cost; the legislature simply fixed an
amount for an individual charter school education and paid a
multiple of that amount directly to the charter schools based on their
enrollment.145 Under the pilot program, the state board approved
fourteen charter applications, and of those, eleven are currently still
in operation.146
By law, all charter schools in New Hampshire are not only public
schools, but are open-enrollment schools.147 This means that a child
from any school district in the state may apply to any charter school
in the state, without regard for whether the charter school is located
within the resident school district.148 Neither residency nor
identification of a student as a child with a disability may be
considered by a charter school when reviewing applications for
admission.149
The latest figures for enrollment in New Hampshire indicate that
students enrolled in charter schools and home-schooling programs
amount to less than 3% (2.42%) of the total school-age
population.150 The student enrollment for non-public schools during
the same time period was at 9 percent, more than three times charter
school enrollment.151 While the combined total of charter and homeschooled students is a small percentage of the New Hampshire
elementary and secondary population, it is because parents can
144. Id.
145. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I)(b).
146. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., Approved Charter Schools in New Hampshire,
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/doe/organization/curriculum/SchoolApproval/
CharterSchools/ApprovedNHCharterSchools.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
147. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III).
148. Id. § 194-B:1(VI).
149. See id. §§ 194-B:1(VIII), 8(I).
150. Percentages calculated from the most recent numbers for fall 2008 through
2009 enrollment collected by the New Hampshire Department of Education. See
N.H.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
ENROLLMENT
BY
GRADE
2008–2009,
http://www.education.nh.gov/data/documents/fall_enroll08_09.pdf
[hereinafter
ENROLLMENT BY GRADE]; N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOL STATISTICS 2008–2009, http://www.education.nh.gov/data/documents/
home_school08_09.pdf.
151. See ENROLLMENT BY GRADE, supra note 150.

File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc

2010

Created on: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

RESIDENCY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

323

unilaterally select either one that the options themselves potentially
disrupt the stability that a residency criterion has traditionally
provided. Enrolling students in charter schools and home schooling
interferes with the planning process and the financial position of the
district by affecting the state funds it receives. Private school
enrollment only exacerbates this instability.
Even though almost 89 percent of the school-age population
continues to attend non-charter public schools, not all are enrolled in
their local school.152 These students, together with students
receiving elementary and secondary education from non-public and
charter schools, or being home schooled, raise questions concerning
the validity of the residency norm. It is understandable, then, why
the organizations representing professional educators tend to oppose
these choices.153
A healthy skepticism is appropriate, but
discussions regarding changes in public education too often revolve
around concern for the established system, with speculation
concerning the consequences of any change and money. While these
are laudable and necessary concerns, the primary concern ought to
be focused on determining what educational delivery system can
best meet the needs of students in the present, so that they may
become adults in the future who will be productive members of their
communities. The balance is too often tilted toward the status quo.
4. The Options Landscape Outside New Hampshire
New Hampshire’s experience with educational models that offer
choices different from the default requirement of public education in
a local school district is not unique. Circumstances within other
states may be significantly different and influenced by any number
of local issues, but like New Hampshire’s experience, many of the
options in other states began as part of popular, national movements
152. See id.
153. Legislative records over the years indicate that at various times the New
Hampshire School Boards Association, the New Hampshire School
Superintendents’ Association, and NH-NEA have opposed some or all of the
legislative initiatives relative to charter schools. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 727
Before the H. & S. Comm. Educ., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2004); BRUNELLE, supra note
99, at 2.

File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc

324

Created on: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

Vol. 8, No. 3

that sprung up around the country.154 The establishment of the
Secretary of Education as a cabinet-level position in 1979 may have
contributed to increased support for, and the momentum gained by,
some of these movements.155
From 1953, when Health, Education, and Welfare became a
cabinet post, until 1979, when Education was set out as a separate
entity, it is reasonable to conclude that the staff and resources
available to education in a shared environment—especially when
one considers the magnitude of the issues faced by those in the
health and welfare arena—were not as significant, nor as focused, as
they have become in the last thirty years. In addition to the focus
provided by an executive branch agency with money to fund
demonstration projects and best practices, Congress has also turned
its attention to the issue of public education. Even the U.S. Supreme
Court has had occasion to affect the public education landscape.156
Another contributing factor may have been the willingness of
some courts during the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s and 1970s to
154. See Vitaska, supra note 37.
155. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Historical Highlights,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
The Cabinet-level Department of Health, Education and Welfare was
created under President Eisenhower, officially coming into existence
April 11, 1953. In 1979, the Department of Education Organization Act
was signed into law, providing for a separate Department of Education.
HEW became the Department of Health and Human Services, officially
arriving on May 4, 1980.
Id.
156. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that
Ohio’s voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that Equal Protection Clause applies to children of
illegal immigrants); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that funding of public education need be only rationally based because
wealth is not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (replacing Everson’s “competing principles” test
with a three-prong test requiring that: (1) the primary effect is to offer a public
welfare benefit, (2) the benefit serves a legitimate public purpose, and (3) there is
no excessive entanglement between church and state); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (creating two competing principles that: (1) no tax can be levied
to support religious activities or institutions; and (2) governments cannot exclude
individuals from receiving the benefit of public welfare legislation due to
religious preference or lack thereof).
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order the busing of public school children to schools outside of their
neighborhoods in order to achieve racially balanced schools within a
geographical area.157 While this may have contributed to the higher
cause of a more integrated society, it may nevertheless have
contributed to the climate that now challenges the primacy of a
residency requirement as a criterion for access to a public education.
The question is: “Is a resident-based delivery system for public
education still justifiable?”
The next sections will look at some of these choices and how
they altered the public education in Florida and Colorado, as well as
how Congress and the Supreme Court have weighed in at the
national level.
IV. FLORIDA
Most people think of Florida as the state where people go to
retire and enjoy the benefits of a climate that is warm and temperate
all year, but in 2006, Florida’s median age was 39.9.158 The largest
population group, at 43.5%, was the 0–34 age group.159 With a total
population of 18,349,132,160 the school-age population in 2006 was
almost 15% of the total, or 2,662,701.161 Florida has sixty-seven
school districts.162 State law permits successful school districts
maximum flexibility to develop alternatives to the delivery of a
standard public school education by using atypical delivery
models.163 The Florida Education Code has one chapter expressly
devoted to alternatives to traditional public schools.164 The state’s
public education delivery system is a countywide system, which
157. See, e.g., Busing in an Angry Glare, LIFE, Mar. 3, 1972 at 26 (discussing
contemporary politics surrounding the busing of public school children in 1972).
158. EDUC. INFO. & ACCOUNTABILITY SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA
EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY DATA PROFILES 1 (2009), available at
http://www.fldoe.org/eias/eiaspubs/word/fecdp0708.doc.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 5.
163. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1000.02(2)(e) (West 2009).
164. Id. §§ 1002.01–.79 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).
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maintains and operates public elementary and secondary schools
throughout the state.165 Florida law allows for the consideration of
parents’ choice when a student is assigned to a school.166 This
“controlled open enrollment,” as it is known, theoretically permits a
student to attend any public school in the county.167
In addition, parents may home-school students, choose a private
school at their expense, or select from a number of different charter
school options.168 As part of its public education delivery system,
the state also offers a school for deaf and blind students,169 virtual
schooling,170 a pilot program beginning in the 2008–2009 school
year that provides high school credit for nationally or state
recognized industrial certification programs,171 the New World
School of the Arts,172 and perhaps most controversially, a voucher
program, known as the “Opportunity Scholarship Program”
(OSP).173 Districts may also offer single-gender schools.174
Among the charter options, districts may offer lab schools175 and
technical career centers.176 Lab schools are partnerships with public
postsecondary schools that allow the lab schools to focus on a
fundamental issue or problem identified in the elementary or
secondary public education system.177 While Florida law permits
preferences in student selection, it appears that, if feasible, any
student in the state may attend a particular lab school.178
The OSP, enacted in 1999, is grounded in the state’s
accountability statutes, which assign a letter grade from “A” to “F”
to each public school based on the performance of its students in
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id. § 1001.30.
See id. § 1002.31.
Id.
See id. § 1002.20(6).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.36.
Id. § 1002.37.
Id. § 1002.375.
Id. § 1002.35.
Id. § 1002.38, invalidated by Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
Id. § 1002.311.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.32.
See id. § 1002.34.
Id. § 1002.32(2)–(3).
See id. § 1002.32(4).
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meeting the proficiency standards set by the state.179 This initiative
“provides that a student who attends or is assigned to attend a failing
public school may attend a higher performing public school or use a
scholarship provided by the state to attend a participating private
school.”180 The Florida Supreme Court ultimately found this
provision unconstitutional.181 The real distinction of this program
may be that it served as a model for sanctions set out in No Child
Left Behind for schools that were identified as schools in need of
improvement and requiring school choice.182
A. Bush v. Holmes
In Bush v. Holmes, parents and organizations challenged the
constitutionality of the OSP under state school provisions183 and the
religious freedom provision184 of the Florida Constitution, as well as
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.185 The case had a
long procedural history, from the trial court in Leon County and the
Florida First District Appellate Court, before it finally got to the
Florida Supreme Court.186 Under the Florida Constitution, when an
appellate court declares a state statute unconstitutional, the state
supreme court is required to review the decision.187
While this case was on remand in the trial court, the U.S.
Supreme Court announced that an Ohio voucher program similar to
the OSP was not unconstitutional.188 The plaintiffs in Holmes then
dropped their Federal Establishment Clause claim.189
In a 5-2 decision, the Florida Supreme Court, relying on article
IX, section 1(a), found that the OSP statute was unconstitutional.190
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id. §§ 1002.38, 1008.34.
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 400 (Fla. 2006).
Id. at 412.
See West, supra note 97, at 176.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 6.
Id. art. I, § 3.
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 398–99.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 397 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1)).
Id. at 399; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 399.
See id. at 413.
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Using the state constitution’s education clause, the court found that
the program undermined the constitutional requirement for the
provision of a uniform and efficient system of public schools.191
The majority reasoned that the OSP provided some students an
alternative to the public education delivery system which
circumvented the uniformity provisions of article IX, section 1 of the
Florida Constitution, while diverting state funds for public education
to a non-public alternative.192
This decision to some degree limited the choices available to
students in Florida and maintained the status quo as far as voucher
programs were concerned, but its effect on strengthening or
supporting the residency requirement was negligible. With a
countywide system of sixty-seven school districts guided by a
controlled open enrollment provision, and with city and town
residency non-essential to student placement, all of the other schoolchoice options, even without a voucher program, drastically diminish
the effect of residency in determining school assignment.
V. COLORADO
Colorado, which gained statehood on August 1, 1876, is divided
into sixty-four counties, and in 2005 had an estimated population of
4,665,177.193 Its public education laws bear a general similarity to
those in other states.194 In 1887, thirteen years after Colorado
became the thirty-eighth state in the Union, a residency requirement
for public education was enacted.195 Although this law remains on
the books, more recent legislative enactments have emasculated the
general provisions of section 22-1-102 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes. The state’s delivery system appears to have been at one

191. See id. at 412.
192. See id.
193. Infoplease.com, Colorado: History, Geography, Population, and State Facts,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108189.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
194. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-504 (West 2005), with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1002.33 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).
195. 1887 Colo. Sess. Laws 301 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-102).
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time organized and maintained at the county level.196 Legislation
enacted in 2008 reorganized the educational delivery system into
twelve regional service areas in order to coordinate the services of
178 school districts, fifty-seven administrative units, and twenty-one
cooperative service boards.197 In considering this reorganization, it
is clear that legislators were mindful of the state’s constitutional
requirement to provide a “thorough and uniform system of free
public schools.”198
The Colorado Department of Education describes the state as an
“educational choice state.”199 On its website, the department lists
charter schools, home schooling, private school, and “other” as
options.200 Charter schools in Colorado, as in other states, are
considered public schools.201 Yet, it is in the “other” category that
one finds a significant number of public options.
The first is an open enrollment provision that began in 1990, like
Florida’s, as a controlled open enrollment to provide choice within
the district.202 By the 1994–1995 school year, Colorado law required
statewide open enrollment.203 The provision even permitted a school
district to deny a request from a resident student to attend a
particular school within the district for a variety of reasons.204
Despite the fact that Colorado’s residency law is still valid, this
provision is arguably the most significant state attack on the
relevancy of a local residence requirement. It appears to signal a
possible shift from the traditional local focus for providing public
education to a more statewide focus.
Colorado’s history suggests the state has always been the
dominant force in public education. Since its adoption in 1876,
article IX, section 2 of the state’s constitution has required the
196. See id. §§ 22-4-101 to 105 (repealed 1984).
197. Id. § 22-5.5-102(2)–(3).
198. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
199. Colo. Dep’t of Educ., Schools of Choice, http://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
200. Id.
201. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-103(2).
202. Id. § 22-36-101(1)(a).
203. Id. § 22-36-101(1)(b).
204. Id. § 22-36-101(3).
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general assembly of the state to provide a public school system.205
The state’s supreme court reinforced the state’s authority in 1952
when it held that school districts were a subdivision of the state, and
the general assembly could abolish them at will.206
The other public options include on-line learning, magnet
schools, school programs, and schools-within-a-school.207 The last
three are alternatives developed and offered by school districts.208
The magnet schools focus on a particular content area, such as lawthemed education.209 School programs focus on special issues and
may be located somewhere other than on a school campus, such as
an educational program for students with recurring disciplinary
issues.210 Finally, schools-within-a-school are available on a school
campus, such as the International Baccalaureate program.211 The
state also provides a school for the deaf and blind.212
A. Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents
Once again, the Colorado legislature enacted a voucher program
that permitted parents to choose non-public schools while using
public funds.213 The money was provided to the parents of children
who qualified based on the requirements of the program, known as
the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program (COCP
program).214 The statute was aimed at students in the highest
poverty schools, whose performance ratings were either low or
unsatisfactory.215
205. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
206. See Hazlet v. Gaunt, 250 P.2d 188, 194 (Colo. 1952).
207. Colo. Dep’t of Educ., Schools of Choice, Other School Options in Colorado,
http://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/otherschooloptions.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2010).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-80-102 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
213. See Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 936
(Colo. 2004) (discussing the creation of the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot
Program).
214. See id.
215. See id.
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In Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers, and
Students, the plaintiffs cited eight claims of unconstitutionality, three
of which involved arguments concerning separation of church and
state, using public funds for sectarian purposes, and the free exercise
of religion.216 The trial court found that the law violated article IX,
section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which states:
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization
of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall
be established a board of education, to consist of three or
more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the
district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the
public schools of their respective districts.217
Colorado has a statute that permits the state supreme court to
review a trial court decision whenever a trial court declares a state
statute unconstitutional.218 Article IX, section 15 was in the original
constitution and has been the basis of the court’s analysis numerous
times.219 Here, the court upheld the trial court decision, finding that
control over instruction was meaningless without control over
funding.220
Once again, the court maintained the status quo without relying
on constitutionally prohibited entanglements between the state and
sectarian elementary and secondary schools. Yet again, the decision
was not pertinent to the effect on the residency requirement because
of the broad application of choice options within the state.

216. See id. at 936 & n.3 (listing plaintiffs claims at length).
217. Id. at 937 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15).
218. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-102(1)(b) (West 2005).
219. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);
Hazlet v. Gaunt, 250 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1952); Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 528 P.2d
1299 (Colo. 1974); Sch. Dist. No. 16 v. Union High Sch. No. 1, 152 P. 1149
(Colo. 1915).
220. See Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 943.
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VI. THE FEDERAL ROLE
A. McKinney-Vento Act
Earlier it was suggested that the creation of the U.S. Department
of Education has led to more activity in the area of public education
by federal actors. The McKinney-Vento Act is one piece of
evidence to support this claim.221 It was enacted in 1987 for the
laudable purpose of permitting homeless children and
unaccompanied youth to access public education, despite the fact
that they or their parents might not be able to establish residency
anywhere.222 The law further requires that states that have barriers
to homeless children and unaccompanied youth enrolling in a public
school must work to remove those barriers.223 It is difficult to
imagine a more compelling federal directive diminishing the role of
a residency requirement that would be consistent with the states’
rights protection provided by the U.S. Constitution.224
B. No Child Left Behind
Another example of federal activity is the 2002 Congressional
enactment known as No Child Left Behind.225 This legislation was
initiated due to a growing concern that our nation’s students could
not compete in a global society and as a way to require more
accountability from the public education system to address this
concern.226 The law did all that and more. It was an overhaul of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act that was enacted in

221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435 (2006).
222. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance (McKinney-Vento) Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-77, § 721, 101 Stat. 482, 525 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
11431).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 11432(d)(2).
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
225. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941).
226. See id. (listing the full title as: “An Act to close the achievement gap with
accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind”).
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1965.227 Since 1979, Congress has tinkered with the provisions of
that act on an almost annual basis. Several reauthorizations were
significant, but this reauthorization was profound.228 It continued
the framework for grading school districts based on how their
students performed on a statewide annual assessment, but now
required states to disaggregate student results based on race, English
proficiency, student poverty, and disability.229 No longer would the
high-performing students be able to carry those students that were
not proficient in meeting the grade-level expectations of the
curriculum. This disaggregation of test scores identified, for the first
time, the traditionally low-performing students that public education
systems were “leaving behind,” and imposed progressive sanctions
over time if schools and districts did not improve all student
performance, as measured by the annual assessment.230
The new law required states to impose a variety of sanctions on
those schools and districts designated as “in need of improvement,”
including the obligation to offer students the choice of another public
school that is not in need of improvement.231 It also favored the
development of charter schools.232 While these measures are
designed to improve public education for all students, they do so
without regard to residency requirements. The option of choice for a
student in a school in need of improvement is, in essence, a voucher,
albeit limited to another public school that is not in need of
improvement. It seeks to move whole school populations out of
their neighborhood schools, thus affecting the balance in building
capacity and transportation schedules, and increasing budgets due to
the districts’ need to transport children out of their neighborhood
schools. In general, charter schools are open enrollment schools, so
their influence on residency can potentially be experienced
statewide. Additionally, every dollar invested by the federal
government on charter schools is a dollar that is not spent to improve
227. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79
Stat. 27.
228. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 note (containing a number of amendments).
229. See id. § 6311.
230. See id. § 6316; 34 C.F.R. § 200.35–.53 (2009).
231. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
232. See id. § 7221.
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schools that have already been classified as “needing improvement.”
The point is that the public policy enacted at the federal level,
designed to improve public education, is undercutting the residentbased delivery system that state laws mandate. This contradiction
has caused more conflict among public school advocates rather than
promoting a thoughtful discussion of reform.233
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Ohio voucher
program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution when it provided vouchers to parents of students in a
failing school district, even when those vouchers could be used at
private, sectarian schools.234 This is one court case that did not find
a voucher program unconstitutional. A court decision upholding a
voucher program that permits students to use public money to go to
private school, especially a private sectarian school, would strike at
the heart of a residency requirement. However, Zelman’s effect on
eroding the residency requirement was not nearly as significant as it
would have been if its holding were given a broader scope. The
holding preserved the public policy adopted by the Ohio legislature,
but only as it pertained to the Establishment Clause.235 This left the
states in the position to have their voucher programs challenged on a
variety of state constitutional grounds. Additionally, the voucher
program itself is limited only to Cleveland because it is the only
school district in Ohio that meets all of the requirements of the
statute.236

233. In 2002, when No Child Left Behind went into effect, associations of
education professionals, as well as some state governors, legislators, and
departments of education openly rebelled. There were threats that states would
refuse federal money. In New Hampshire, there were several legislative initiatives
that attempted to remove the state from the federal entanglement or at least limit
the affect of the new federal law. One example of a successful initiative is section
193-H:5 of the New Hampshire Statutes. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:5
(2008).
234. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
235. See id. at 662–63.
236. Id. at 644–45.
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Those challenging school voucher programs to private schools
continue to be successful by raising other state constitutional claims.
Both Holmes and Colorado Congress of Parents were litigated after
Zelman, but the voucher programs were struck down as violations of
the education clauses rather than the religion clauses of those states’
constitutions.237 Martin West states that vouchers, along with tax
credits and charter schools, “threaten the district-based system of
education provision that has long been dominant in the United
States.”238 This system maintains its existence primarily by its
reliance on state residency statutes.
VII. THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
The national phenomenon known as “school finance litigation” is
the linchpin of the seemingly unrelated statutory enactments and
judicial decisions that have diminished the importance of the
residency requirement as the entry point in public education, and the
rapid technological advances in the last generation that will continue
to challenge the legitimacy of the residency requirement. On one
side of the school-funding challenges is the natural progression of
public education, established through public-policy decisions
adopted by state and federal legislative enactments, with refinements
by judicial decisions. On the other side is society’s entry into a
world where communication is immediate and intelligent machines
replace people in the workforce. Therefore, it is important to
understand the impact of this phenomenon on the residency
requirement.
Forty-six American states have been a party in school finance
litigation.239 The four states that have not been a part of this public
education experience are Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah.240
237. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo.
2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
238. West, supra note 97, at 168.
239. John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION, supra note 97, at 96, 96.
240. Id. at 112 n.1.

File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc

336

Created on: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

Vol. 8, No. 3

The litigation can be categorized into three phases.241 In the first
phase, the plaintiffs’ cases were rooted in the Federal Equal
Protection Clause and advanced the theory that equal protection
meant equal funding.242 These cases were not successful. 243 Federal
courts were not anxious to enter a realm where local control and
states’ rights were the dominant response.244 The second phase
moved to state courts and states’ equal protection clauses.245 These
cases were somewhat more successful.246 State courts were not
always as concerned about the realm of local control.247 After all,
school districts are political subdivisions of the state, and as such
have only such power and authority as is granted by the state.248
It was not until the third phase that school-funding litigation
finally was more successful and had a greater influence on state
funding decisions concerning public education.249 In this phase,
plaintiffs relied on state constitutional education clauses to support
the theory that state-financing systems did not deliver an adequate
education for each child in the public education system.250 The most
notable, albeit relatively modest, effect of all the phases of school
funding litigation is that it has centralized the funding of public
education at the state level.251 The consequence of this shift,
whether intended or unintended, is to further and irreparably
diminish the importance of residency in a local school district in
order to access public education.
Some anticipate that the next phase of litigation will be a return
to the federal courts with claims based on the Citizenship and

241. Id. at 96.
242. Id. at 96–97.
243. See id. at 97.
244. See id.
245. Dinan, supra note 239, at 97.
246. See id. at 97–98.
247. See id.
248. School districts, like cities, towns, and other political subdivisions, are
creatures of the state. They only have the enumerated powers granted to them by
the state constitution or through legislative enactments. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
249. See Dinan, supra note 239, at 98.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 101–02, 105.

File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc

2010

Created on: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

RESIDENCY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM

337

Enforcement Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.252 The theory of this
challenge is that the Equal Protection Clause requires that all
children in the country have access to an adequate education and the
Enforcement Clause grants Congress the authority to enforce that
access.253 The obstacle to success may be the fact that education is
not yet considered to be a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution.254 Therefore, a state only needs to show a rational
basis for its financing system.255 If a new round of cases based on
this premise can clear this hurdle, one might anticipate a result
similar to the state adequacy cases, where the most notable result
may be a shift in funding public education to the federal government.
Such a shift would effectively remove local control, along with its
residency requirement, from any significant role in public education.
Unlike Colorado and Florida, New Hampshire is one of the states
where plaintiffs’ successful efforts have caused several changes in
the state’s funding model and caused at least one state supreme court
justice to suspect that the state was not adequately funding public
education.256 In 1978, Colorado plaintiffs sued in state court
claiming the state’s financing plan was unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause of both the Colorado and U.S.
Constitutions.257 The court held that neither constitution established
education as a fundamental right and the legislature was not required
to establish a central public school financing system that restricted
each school district to equal expenditures per student.258 The Florida
adequacy case came towards the end of phase three, when courts
252. See id. at 109.
253. See id. at 109–110.
254. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
255. See id. at 40.
256. See Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 998 (N.H.
2006) (Duggan, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part). In the
concurrence and dissent, Justice Duggan suggested that what the legislature
appropriated for the cost of an adequate education was not based on the actual
cost, but a pre-determined number. Id. at 996. That implies that the distribution
formula was backed into based on the numbers and how much to send to each of
the school districts. See id.
257. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010 n.1, 1014 (Colo.
1982).
258. See id. at 1016, 1018, 1025.
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were not so anxious to get involved in the school funding cases due
to the protracted nature of the cases and the prospect of being asked
to make public policy decisions that were best left to the realm of the
legislative branch.259 The court held that the plaintiffs had not
articulated “an appropriate standard for determining ‘adequacy’ that
would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the
powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature.”260
VIII. THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER INITIATIVES
On the other side of school finance litigation is the world of the
Information Age. Once again, our society is experiencing a
fundamental shift in our economy that suggests the need for
substantial changes in the methods for participating in this new age.
The current difficulties due to economic changes are not unlike
difficulties faced by past societies, such as the move from an
agrarian economy into the age of the Industrial Revolution. As we
attempt to understand how we will function in this new economy,
and as we deal with a growth in technology that is perhaps greater
than any other generation has known, it should be apparent that such
changes will require new knowledge and skills. This requirement is
likely to alter both the content and the delivery system of public
education in our nation. Even now, technology is providing new
methods for providing education in our current system.261 New
initiatives and partnerships will likely also contribute to the
discussions concerning public policy changes in public education.
A. Virtual Learning
Virtual learning is a delivery system in which student learning
takes place at a computer. These programs are structured, provide
rigorous academic content, involve certified teachers, and may be
259. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400, 408 (Fla. 1996).
260. Id.
261. See generally LUCINDA GRAY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS: FALL 2008 (2009), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010003.pdf.
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synchronous, asynchronous, or both. The thought of an elementary
or secondary school student receiving an education by sitting at a
computer could not have been imagined by today’s “Baby Boomers”
or their parents, yet there are a number of states where the public
education delivery system includes this option.262 Both Colorado
and Florida have statutes that add virtual learning to their mix of
public school choice.263 In New Hampshire, there is a charter school
that offers only virtual learning to its students.264
B. Competition in a Global Economy
The advances in technology have affected more than public
education. Our world has shrunk to the point where an event
anywhere in the world can be communicated almost instantly to all
parts of the planet. Employees may be permitted to work at home
because of the advances in communication and supporting
technology. It is possible to provide video and audio connections so
that people in multiple locations, anywhere in the world, can meet
and work on a business issue from their own office, rather than each
of them commuting to a single destination. In order for present-day
students to compete in this rapidly growing technological
environment, our public education system may require a
reconfiguration of both the curriculum and the delivery system to
prepare our students for a promising future in the Information Age.
This will require new thinking about the entire public policy
dimension of public education at the national and state levels.
C. Common Core Standards
In June of 2009, forty-nine states and territories agreed to
participate in an initiative co-sponsored by the National Governors
Association (NGA) and the Council of Chief State School Officers

262. See, e.g., id. at tbls.6, 7, & B-2.
263. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.7-101 (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1002.415 (West 2009).
264. Virtual Learning Academy, Charter School, http://www.vlacs.org/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2010).
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(CCSSO).265 The purpose of this initiative is to develop common
core standards in English-language arts and mathematics for all
public schools.266 It is important to note that participation in this
project does not obligate any state to adopt the standards that are
developed by the project.267 There is some indication that the
current Federal Department of Education may use these standards as
one benchmark for evaluating state applications for at least some
federal program funding.268 Projects such as this one support a
possible shift toward the centralization of responsibility for public
education away from the local level and toward the state level.
Ultimately, such initiatives may cause a further shift away from the
states and toward the centralization of public education at the federal
level. Either shift diminishes the justification for a resident-based
public education delivery system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The effects of statutory changes, school funding litigation, and
technology and current initiatives appear to converge in a paradigm
shift away from the traditional local control and resident-based
delivery of public education, and toward a more centralized system
at either the state or national level. The first victim of this shift is the
traditional requirement that children attend the public schools in the
district where they reside.
As the economic foundation of a society shifts, public education
must also evolve. Those living in an agrarian economy did not
require much education because they relied on all able-bodied
persons to engage in farm work as the basis for economic support.
At that time, school schedules were designed to be compatible with
the times in a day and the seasons of the year when children could
attend school without neglecting their obligations to the farm and
265. Press Release, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Forty-Nine States and Territories Join
Common Core Standards Initiative (June 1, 2009), available at
http://www.corestandards.org (click “More news releases” on left; click link to
June 1, 2009 news release).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,806 (July 29, 2009).
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family. The shifts to an industrial economy and then to a service
economy have both required society to significantly alter the
curriculum and delivery of public education.
As we now
contemplate yet another shift into a global and technological
economy, it is time to reconsider our current curriculum and delivery
models in public education. One of the first criteria we should be
ready to discard is the tenacious reliance on local residency in order
to gain access to the public education system.
The residency requirement is not the most significant substantive
element of reform in public education, but it is arguably the most
important procedural element. It is the first and most difficult barrier
to critical thinking regarding the status quo. It may also be the one
that is the most problematic, at least initially, to overcome.
In his article on state school finance litigation, John Dinan
concludes that traditional reliance on local governance and funding
of public education is unlikely to be displaced or significantly altered
by school-finance litigation.269 That conclusion may be accurate
from a limited focus on school financing litigation, itself.270
However, when school finance litigation is viewed along with state
and federal court decisions, statutes in areas of public education
(such as public choice, vouchers, and other alternatives), and rapidly
expanding technology that creates a significantly different global
economy, the reliance on local governance and a residence-based
delivery system is certainly debatable. Today, it may be more
apparent that a paradigm shift is in the making. At the moment, it
appears that such a shift favors increased responsibility for
governance and, therefore, funding of public education at the state
level, or perhaps even the federal level.
Ultimately, the shift may be toward the federal government. If a
new round of school finance litigation that relies on challenges at the
federal court level based on the Citizenship and Enforcement
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution are successful, there may be less
discrepancy in funding across the states. New partnerships like the
current NGA and CCSSO initiative to develop common core
standards in public education aim to level the disparity among states
269. Dinan, supra note 239, at 112.
270. See id.
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concerning what students learn in order to provide an education that
prepares all students for postsecondary education or work.271 A
recent article by Russ Whitehurst, Senior Fellow at the Brown
Center, indicates that it is curriculum that is of primary importance
in education and assessment.272 Does all of this suggest that a
national curriculum is necessary for a twenty-first century
education? Do these factors support a public education system that
is not driven by student residence?
A holistic analysis and discussion regarding significant changes
in our traditional public education system will be emotionally
charged, and until now it has been largely been avoided in this
country. The question is, can we continue this avoidance in the
wake of a potential paradigm shift? Common wisdom suggests that
the forthcoming reauthorization of NCLB is likely to continue and
perhaps strengthen the provisions that support public choice and
charter schools. While all of these endeavors may be part of a new
public education system, they are inconsistent with local autonomy
and create a situation where the criterion of local residency is
increasingly less relevant.
This analysis takes no position on whether such a paradigm shift,
whether at the state or federal level, is desirable. Its purpose is to
simply raise awareness to the existence of such a shift, so that public
policy makers at all levels may consider the intended and potentially
unintended consequences of the seemingly unrelated changes that
are occurring in public education at both the state and national level.
This heightened state of awareness will permit state and federal
legislators and state boards of education to weigh the options in an
integrated, global context, rather than as isolated and individual
elements of a system. In this manner, public-policy makers will be
able to move toward a goal that will provide every child with access
to a twenty-first century education, no matter where in America that
child lives. Better partnerships among the local, state, and federal
actors and stakeholders are needed to support a model that first
values student learning and then considers cost as one of the first
271. See Press Release, supra note 265.
272. See GROVER J. WHITEHURST, DON’T FORGET THE CURRICULUM (2009),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/1014_curriculum_whitehurst.
aspx.
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elements of this new conversation. In such a model, the first
question may be: “Does where a student lives determine what public
education that student may access?” That answer should be: “No.”
While residency may continue to be cited as an important factor
for planning, if the costs shift from local districts to a state or the
federal government, the reduced fiscal obligations of a local district
make residency within a particular school district less important.
The residency argument may also be less important with the growth
in virtual learning, charter schools, and other publicly financed,
alternative-education programs that are available to students. If
where a student lives is no longer relevant to the education a student
may access, how will we as a society make the transition from a
standard that we have relied on for more than three centuries? This
should be the next public policy discussion in public education
around the country.
Looking at Florida, Colorado, and New Hampshire provides
evidence that a delivery model for public education is currently less
driven by residency and more focused on innovation and change.
The final question is: Will the residency requirement in public
education be repealed as part of a thoughtful, orderly transition, or
will it simply become so irrelevant as to be ignored? The latter will
be the case if we continue the current scheme of “tinkering” with the
public education system. To simply react to emerging issues with
amendments to the existing structure avoids the more difficult
process of large-scale reform. Yet, paradigm shifts frequently
require such reform.
For New Hampshire, and states similarly situated, a tradition of
strict adherence to the doctrine of local control will impede the
process of a thoughtful, orderly reform of the public education
system. While there is nothing inherently detrimental in the notion
of local control, it does not guarantee either the most efficient use of
resources or the best results. In the case of public education, local
control is not historically justifiable. Initially, it was the provincial
government, the forerunner of the state, that mandated the creation
of a public education system and fined selectmen that neglected the
mandate.273 When preparing to enter statehood, it was the framers of
273. See Act of Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358.
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the New Hampshire Constitution that, out of their support for state
encouragement of education and state funding for schools, drafted a
specific article that obligated the state to implement their concept.274
The article was ratified by the voters of the period.275 This article
and the history surrounding its adoption were the basis for the state
supreme court to find that the provision of an adequate education
was a state responsibility.276 The ability of the state to delegate
some of its duties to its political subdivisions never relieves the state
of its primary obligation. Additionally, there is another provision in
the New Hampshire Constitution that shares the same history
without amendment as part II, article 83, and that is part I, article 3,
which states in relevant part: “When men enter into a state of
society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society
. . . .”277 This is not a history that supports the notion of local
control. Instead of continuing the power struggle between the state
and local school districts, perhaps a better partnership between the
two would create the climate in which the conversations concerning
large-scale reform could begin.
It appears that the doctrine of local control is not a major
impediment to such discussions in states like Florida and Colorado.
This may be because neither state emerged directly out of the
American colonial experience, or because these states invested
county governance with more power and authority than states like
New Hampshire did, or it may be due to some other reason
altogether. Whatever the reason, it appears that these states find it
easier to embrace change and offer more alternatives in public
education. While this does not exempt these states from the reform
conversations, it is likely that these conversations will occur sooner
and produce noticeable results earlier.
None of this is to suggest that reform in any state will be easy or
happen quickly. In fact, a thoughtful, orderly transition argues
against wholesale, rapid reform. The point is: it is time for
meaningful dialogue to begin. Remaining firmly entrenched in the
past and wrapped in the cloak of our sacred traditions is not in the
274. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83.
275. Id. pt. II, art. 83, annots.
276. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993).
277. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 3.
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best interest of our children. While systemic reform does not require
that we abandon all elements of our current system, it does require
that we enter into conversations without a preconceived adherence to
any particular element, and with a willingness to analyze existing
elements, along with new elements, and choose those, whether old or
new, that will provide the best public education system we can offer
to all children. We cannot afford to do less.
During the last century, public education evolved slowly, with
changes caused by federal and state legislative enactments and
judicial decisions. This process was appropriate for an era when all
change, even economic and social change, was incremental. That
era has ended. We now find ourselves in an era where change is
constant and immediate, and our society is more global than local.
This era will create new opportunities that will require knowledge
and skills that are unlike those of the past in some respects. Success
will be achieved by those, whether at the local, state, or national
level, that meet the challenge of this new era by providing the
educational system that produces men and women who are prepared
for the opportunities in a global community.

